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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines responses to the terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping 
Centre in Nairobi in September 2013 in order to investigate the role played by blood 
donation, as an expression of national dreams, in the political imaginary of 
contemporary Kenya. It considers the symbolic effectiveness of calls for blood 
donation made by political figures in the aftermath of the attacks. Such calls drew on 
a tradition of donation drives begun in the early years of independence, which 
emphasized the modernizing imperative of the new state, and the importance of unity, 
hard work and self-sacrifice in building the nation. However, the reaction to Westgate, 
including calls for blood donation, also needs to be understood with reference to the 
response of American and other leaders to equivalent terrorist attacks in more recent 
years. These elite dreams found resonance among ordinary citizens and blood 
donation recruiters. But there were also subjected to trenchant critiques which sought 
to expose the reality of the transfusion system, as well as the inequality and injustice 
which marks the general health care system and Kenyan society as a whole. These 
shortcomings were also highlighted by mobilization drives organized by Kenya’s 
Somali and Asian communities both before and during the Westgate crisis. The latter 
are presented by their organizers as a means of overcoming historic exclusion and 
discrimination.  
 
 
                                                 
1
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INTRODUCTION 
The terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi in 2013 prompted a wave 
of blood donation across Kenya which was widely remarked upon by national and 
international media. Politicians and journalists, as well as many donors themselves, 
ascribed important communicative effects to the donations, concerning the trajectory 
of the Kenyan state, the unity of its peoples and its membership of the international 
community. These virtues, it was said, would be maintained in the face of the terrorists’ 
perceived motive of spreading division and chaos, as well as broader doubts cast on 
the viability of the Kenyan state by the massive civil disturbance which had followed 
contested presidential elections in late 2007.  
 
The present paper investigates the content of these messages, the manner in which 
they spoke to contemporary political crises and echoed historical narratives of 
development and national security. I hope to show that they depended for their 
rhetorical purchase on the capacity of blood collection, processing and distribution 
systems to constitute biopolitical groupings or ‘collectives’, in this case the nation itself 
(Copeman 2009b: 85-92).  Ideal, internationally prescribed modes of donation and 
transfusion provide the stuff of national dreams of progress and sovereignty. That such 
utopianism has endured over the half century or more since independence is perhaps 
unexpected given the diminution of the welfare functions of African states in the long 
decades of neo-liberal adjustment. As Geissler has emphasized, with weakening 
national health institutions, collective bio-identities are more likely to emerge at local 
or indeed transnational levels, among the subjects of cross-border clinical trials, for 
example (2012: 198, 203-4). In this case, Westgate is taken to illustrate an enduring, 
widespread desire to affirm the national by participating in a Kenya-wide blood 
procurement system based on solidarity and altruism. This biopolitical longing does 
not culminate in the bare act of donation. The latter is framed more widely as a 
contribution to the achievement of national development, overcoming ‘tribal’ divisions 
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and conforming to international haematological and public health norms (Simpson 
2011: 255-8).  
 
The nation thus re-appears on the affective horizon of the biopolitical. But it must still 
be remembered that this is an ideal, a revival in fact of early independence dreams 
that Kenya, like other African states, would participate on equal terms in global science 
and medicine (Droney 2014: 366). Political leaders and commentators profited from 
these connotations of hopefulness in glossing the wave of blood donation. But my 
research shows that such associations were susceptible to contest and disruption by 
disruptive critiques of the blood donation and of the political elite who encouraged it. 
These were based on counter-narratives pointing to the limited reach of the modernist 
ideal of anonymous, unremunerated donations into a national system dispensing 
blood and related products to all citizens on grounds of medical need alone. In 
practice, diverse sectoral and private initiatives are seen to supplement the official 
system or bypass it completely. Smaller biopolitical collectivities are, thus, constituted 
around more exclusive sub-national categories, including ethnicity and religious 
affiliation. Class and geographical location also influence participation in these non-
state systems of donation and transfusion, as well as access to medical care generally. 
Inequality and exclusion are the hallmarks of this domain. Rumours circulate of waste, 
commercialism and outright corruption in hospital blood procurement. The 
hopefulness associated with biological citizenship, is replaced here by wariness and 
risk-aversion, based on disillusionment with the nation and its modernist dreams (Rose 
and Novas 2004: 439). 
 
In developing this perspective, the paper draws on a review of academic material, as 
well as media commentary produced in the two months after the attack. The latter is 
complemented by insights gained from a series of interviews that I conducted in that 
period with blood donation recruiters working variously in state agencies, large NGOs, 
private hospitals and among religious communities.2 Using a semi-structured format, 
interviewees were invited to reflect on the challenges facing blood donation systems 
and the moral and political values underpinning them. Interviews were also used to 
                                                 
2 All interviewees have been anonymized. This research was carried out under Research 
Authorization NACOSTI/P/14/0818/628 issued by the Kenyan National Council for Science, 
Technology and Innovation. 
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confirm and augment my understanding of the practical operation of diverse donor 
recruitment initiatives. As my concern was with the rhetorical and representational 
work of official, semi-official and community bodies, I did not interview blood donors 
themselves or medical professionals involved in transfusion. The motivations of such 
professionals and citizens awaits further research. 
 
WESTGATE: CRISIS, DONATION, RHETORIC 
 
At around 12.30pm on Saturday 21 September 2013 members of the Islamist group 
Al-Shabaab stormed the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi.3 Firing automatic 
weapons and throwing grenades more or less at random they killed over 60 shoppers 
and restaurant goers in the mall, including children.4 Only those who could prove that 
they were Muslims were spared. The group claimed that the attack was in response 
to Kenya’s invasion and occupation of southern Somalia in 2011. The action to secure 
the mall and capture the attackers was only concluded by the following Tuesday 
evening. The state response has been characterized as ‘woefully disorganized’.5 
Police and soldiers from the Kenya Defence Force, as well as local vigilantes and 
armed foreign nationals appear to have operated at cross-purposes, with fatal 
consequences in a number of cases. Afterwards it became apparent that state forces 
had systematically looted the mall taking cash, valuable goods on sale and alcoholic 
drinks (Dixon 2013).  
 
News of the attack was almost immediately followed by a rush of would-be blood 
donors to the main hospitals in Nairobi. Numbers were so great that many were turned 
away (Were 2013a). The next day temporary blood donation centres were organized 
at Uhuru Park and Kencom Bus station, among other locations in the city. Large 
numbers of donors also presented at hospitals elsewhere in the country. According to 
the Director of the Kenya National Blood Transfusion Service, Dr Margaret Oduor, 
around 11,000 units had been collected nationwide by the end of the week, that is 
                                                 
3
 See Howden (2013); New York Police Department (2013); McConnell (2015). 
4
 The total death toll has been set at 67: 48 Kenyan citizens and 19 foreigners, see Anderson 
and McKnight (2015: 16). 
5
 Howden (2013). 
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nearly five times more than would normally have been collected in that period 
(Wambugu 2013; Dutta 2012).  
 
The wave of donation was prominently referenced, commended and interpreted in 
official and media responses to the attack, not least by President Uhuru Kenyatta. In 
a television address on the first day of the crisis he asserted that Kenyans having 
‘fought proudly and bravely to secure the freedom to lead our lives as we choose’ must 
not ‘retreat into a closed, fearful and fractured society’: an ‘open and united country’ 
would defeat the terrorists (2013a). These words echoed the speeches of US 
President George W Bush in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and Washington 
DC on 11th September 2001.6 America too had been targeted for its way of life, but 
had ‘stood down enemies before and [would] do so this time’ as ‘all Americans from 
every walk of life [would] unite … for justice and peace’ (Bush 2001a).7  
 
These speeches perform what James Murphy has called the genre of ‘crisis rhetoric’ 
(2003: 609). Both Presidents spoke for the nation at a time of emergency, affirming its 
essential character (‘what we are’) and its resilient identity (‘that we are’).8 Both framed 
the attacks as a special time which demanded the renewal of deep, but neglected 
principles.9 Both offered a series of vignettes intended to replace the fearful scenes on 
the rolling news, referencing the work of rescuers and the security forces. Both gave 
prominence to the mass blood donations which had ensued and saw in them an 
illustration of their nation’s ‘timeless values of … compassion and solidarity’ (Kenyatta, 
2013a).10  The similarities between the speeches of both presidents were not merely 
a function of the similar circumstances in which they were made. Rather, I would 
                                                 
6
 See Murphy (2003: 611 and 616).  
7
 Prime Minister Tony Blair made a similar appeal to resilience and values in the aftermath of 
the 7 July 2005 attacks in London. Unlike Bush and Kenyatta, he made no reference to blood 
donation see Blair (2005). 
8
 Poulakos argues that crisis rhetoric does not simply respond to the emergency, it produces 
it (2013: 13). 
9
 For Bush, with 911 ‘we have found our mission and our moment’ (Murphy 2003: 623); for one 
of Kenyatta’s spokesmen, Westgate ‘brought out the real picture of who we are’ (Munene 
2013). The function of ‘crisis’ in revealing hidden truths in discussed in Roitman (2014). 
10
 There had also been a large wave of donation across the United States on and after the 9/11 
attacks, see Starr (2002).  
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suggest that Kenyatta was more or less deliberately performing the script of ‘how to 
respond to a terrorist attack’ established by American, British and other leaders.11  
 
The President’s detection of a national motive for donation is supported by the 
prominence of the hashtags #weareone and #unitedwestand, and by the perceptions 
of hospital staff and third sector recruiters shared in interviews conducted in the weeks 
following the attack.12 The work of Jacob Copeman suggests that blood donation in 
such circumstances involves more than simple adhesion to a pre-existing community 
and its values (2009b: 72). The mechanisms of collecting and redistributing blood 
could be figured as an in-gathering of citizens, constituting the nation as a biopolitical 
collective in terms legible to itself and the rest of the world.13 It did this by sustaining 
three key connotations of modern ‘stateness’,14 which I will discuss in the following 
sections: 1) the overcoming of tribalism; 2) patriotic sacrifice and productivity; and 3) 
order and medical enlightenment. Each supported Kenyatta’s rhetorical ambition to 
position Kenya, a long-standing ally of Britain and the United States, as a reliable 
partner in the ‘war on terror’ and a member of the ‘international community’ waging 
that war.15  
 
‘NOW OUR BLOOD FLOWS THROUGH EACH OTHER’: OVERCOMING 
TRIBALISM 
In an idiom familiar from American and British reactions to similar attacks, the terrorists 
were said to have Kenya’s ‘multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious society’ in 
their sights.16 The donations were figured as an assertion of national unity. The hash 
tag #weareone was widely used on Twitter where information regarding the attack and 
                                                 
11
 Prime Minister Tony Blair made a similar appeal to resilience and values in the aftermath of 
the 7th July bomb attacks in London. Unlike Bush and Kenyatta, he made no reference to 
blood donation (Blair 2005). 
12
 Simon, Gloldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin and Adini (2014); Interview with Laboratory 
Administrator, Nairobi, 15 October 2013.  
13
 The international focus on Westgate and on the state’s response was widely noted in the 
Kenyan media, see for example (Muraya 2013). Moss and O’Hare have noted a similar 
awareness of the external view in relation to the staged debates between candidates in the 
2013 presidential election (2014). 
14
 See Eggen (2012). 
15
 US support for anti-terrorism programmes in the East African region included a $100 
million aid package authorized by the Bush administration in 2003 (Aronson 2013: 30). 
16
 See for example, Korir (2013). 
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responses to it, including blood donation were shared.17 A widely circulated image 
showed seven arms extended, with sleeves rolled up. On the exposed skin was written 
‘Now our blood flows through each other’ (Okwemba 2013). President Kenyatta also 
affirmed that the ‘overwhelming response’ to appeals for donations showed that ‘deep 
inside, where it counts most, we are one indivisible national family’ (2013b).  
 
The unified national collective thus evoked was not without shadow. Rather, it was 
counterposed to the chaotic division which Kenya allegedly displayed to the world 
during civil conflict which followed the disputed Presidential election of 2007.18 Though 
prosecutors of the International Criminal Court charged political leaders with the 
direction of ethnic militias in this period, much of Kenya’s media was happier to fall 
back on notions of the inherent tribalism of ordinary citizens as an explanation for the 
violence (Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis 2014: 11). ‘Retreating to our tribal cocoons’, 
said a Daily Nation editorial during Westgate, ‘has done this country more harm than 
good ... we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that we are one.’19  
 
The concern with ‘tribe’ was evident in the President’s praise for citizens gifting blood 
‘without pausing to consider whether [the recipients] were Giriama, Dasanash, 
Turkana, Kuria, Embu’ (Kenyatta 2013b). This listing ironically displays the 
enumerative logic of colonial government which hardened ethnic and linguistic 
identities into fixed and exclusive categories, a framework carried over by independent 
Kenya where ethnicity was entrenched as a key marker of privilege and preferment 
(Guha 2003; Atieno-Odhiambo 1987). Blood donation and transfusion offers an almost 
unique mode of producing unity out of this multiplicity, combining centripetal with 
centrifugal motion: blood is gathered in, then mixed or processed, then distributed ‘out’ 
again.  As Copeman notes, the organizers of Indian blood donation camps, like the 
Kenyan sources discussed here, trade precisely on the effectiveness of this dual 
motion in presenting their work as capable of dissolving sub-national bonds, like 
                                                 
17
 Kenya is reckoned to be the second most active African country on Twitter, see Simon, 
Gloldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin and Adini (2014).  
18
 As Wanner put it ‘So today Kenyans are Kenyans, all united by the outrage. For perhaps 
the first time since his controversial election, President Uhuru Kenyatta is President of all.’  
(2013). 
19
 See Anon (2013a). A joint press-conference held by President Kenyatta and his defeated 
rivals in the elections of 2013 was seen as a coming together not just of party leaders, but of 
ethnic figureheads, not least by the leaders themselves see Kutuny (2013). 
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religion, caste and tribe, and in realizing thereby a national collective (2009b: 90-2). 
Dreams of unity are cast vividly in terms of physical consubstantiality. The rhetorical 
and the real converge. 
 
The biopolitical capacity of blood to overcome boundaries depends fundamentally on 
the mutual anonymity of donor and donee, a feature prized during Westgate when it 
was said 'all turned up to save the lives of those injured’ in the attack ‘blind to race, 
tribe [and] economic status’ (Muraya 2013). Such ‘blindness’ was first identified as a 
prerequisite of ethical donation by Richard Titmuss in his germinal 1971 text The Gift 
Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1997: 127) and is now a standard 
feature of most official donation systems.20 It is stressed by Kenyan recruiters in their 
mobilization work: 
you’re told that your blood will support a Kenyan out there who is not necessarily 
your tribe, not necessarily your sex, not necessarily your religion. Blood is the 
only thing that we can share if you’re blood groups are the same … Blood is the 
only uniting factor.21  
In short the donations allowed the disunity and near collapse of the Kenyan state in 
2007/8 to be figured as temporary eruption, an atavistic detour on the nation’s journey 
to modernity. 
 
‘NO LIMIT TO YOUR SACRIFICE’: WASTE AND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Donation was also represented as the replenishment of depleted stock and, relatedly 
as labour in the national interest.22 ‘Blood’, said one commentator, ‘flowed endlessly 
at Westgate and individuals from all walks of life heeded calls ... to donate their own 
for the injured’ (Muraya, 2013). Replenishment often has a specific focus in times of 
war and national crisis, aimed at matching the sacrifices of the armed forces and 
making good the loss of their blood (Simpson 2009: 115-6). The figuration of blood as 
a means of restoring the unity and vitality of the nation dates back to the early 
independence period. In mid-1960s Kenya donor recruitment had been expressly 
linked in this way to Kenya Defence Forces fighting the ‘Shifta’ insurgency among the 
                                                 
20
 However, donation system managers are generally able to trace the identity of the donor to 
allow investigation of transfusion related diseases (Starr 1998: 313ff). 
21
 Interview with National Blood Safety Coordinator, Nairobi, 2 December 2013. 
22
 Kenyatta (2013b). 
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Somali minority, but also to the deprivations suffered by leaders of the independence 
movement in the previous decade (Hornsby 2013: 96).23 A week of blood donation 
drives was held in the run up to Kenyatta Day, an annual holiday to mark the date in 
1952 when British authorities had arrested six prominent activists, including first 
President Jomo Kenyatta (Schneider 2013: 71). Ongoing citizen donation was needed 
to satisfy the blood debt owed to the founding generation and secure the nation as a 
biopolitical community.24 The debt continues to be invoked, for example by the current 
President a rally some weeks after Westgate to mark the same holiday, now re-named 
Mashujaa (‘Heroes’) Day. The national flag, he said was ‘reverently emblazoned … 
with the red of their sacred blood’ (Kenyatta, 2013c). 
 
The blood economy, thus evoked, is not merely symbolic. Rather it is figured as a 
practical matter of husbanding the nation’s resources, the avoidance of waste being a 
central task of post-colonial, developmental states.25 A sense of this imperative was 
conveyed by donors during Westgate who: ‘all turned up to contribute a pint of blood 
as a way to feel we were doing something, to feel less useless after the senseless 
[and therefore wasteful] violence of Westgate’ (Wanner 2013). There is no simple 
equivalence between loss and donation, however. On the one hand, donors are asked 
to ‘rededicate themselves to the service of the free nation’ by sacrificing a pint of blood 
in memory of soldiers or freedom fighters who made ‘the supreme sacrifice’ of their 
lives.26 On the other hand the benefits of a single donation are multiplied well beyond 
the original contribution, ‘saving lives all over Kenya’ according to current National 
Blood Transfusion Service recruitment posters.27 This effect is possible because of the 
productivity of each donation. ‘Blood economy’ means that once drawn, a single unit 
can be broken up into platelets, plasma, red cells and so on (through the process of 
fractionation) which are recombined for transfusion to many recipients meeting a wide 
variety of medical needs (Starr 1998: 211-212). In the words of the President there 
would be ‘no limit’ to the ‘patriotic sacrifice’ of donors (Kenyatta 2013b). The latter 
                                                 
23
 For a sample of contemporaneous newspaper reports, see Moore (1966), Anon (1967), Anon 
(1969), Anon (1971). The ‘Shifta’ conflict is discussed in Anderson (2014); Carrier and Lochery 
(2013). 
24
 See for example Anon (1967). 
25
 See Neocleous (2011).  
26
  Anon (1971). 
27
 National Blood Transfusion Service poster – copy on file with author. 
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would, moreover, suffer no loss beyond ‘a little of their time’,28 since blood is re-
produced in the body within two or three days, a phenomenon known as 
haematopoiesis.  
 
Blood circulates, then, as a form of capital in a process of magically expanding value 
(Waldby and Mitchell 2007). To persist in a Marxian idiom, the donor’s attending and 
permitting blood to be drawn can be understood as labour, measured in time, 
necessary to the accumulation of biocapital. No mere economic datum, this process 
is inscribed within political aspirations to a specifically capitalist development which 
have been articulated by Kenyan state leaders since independence in 1963 
(Government of Kenya 1965).  That model obviously sought to harmonize building the 
nation with the pursuit of private profit. But it did not rule out altruism. On the contrary, 
the nationalist motto of Uhuru na Kazi (freedom and work) was also realized through 
Harambee schemes mobilizing local communities for development projects.29 Post-
colonial citizenship was, thus, tied to the gift of voluntary labour (Prince 2015: 100). As 
I have noted above, the nation-state may have weakened as a frame for biopolitical 
inclusion. However, the Westgate donations, understood as work contributing to a type 
of capitalist development, show the persistence of this ideal of volunteering in the 
national interest. 
 
The link between blood and national development was given a contemporary inflection 
in the President’s comment that, rather like the anti-insurgent forces in the 1960s, the 
murdered shoppers had made ‘the ultimate sacrifice’.30 This curious locution may be 
explained with reference to the emblematic role of Westgate in the latest iteration of 
Kenya’s capitalist development, one which has seen a shift in emphasis from 
production to consumption. Opened in 2007 the mall and others like it across the city 
were proof than an African middle class had at last emerged, confirming the hopes 
and predictions of development economists, not least at the World Bank.31 It was also 
a sign that Nairobi could cater for the thousands of well-paid diplomats and aid workers 
                                                 
28
 National Blood Transfusion Service poster – copy on file with author. 
29
 ‘Harambee’ was explicitly used as a motivating slogan in blood donation posters in the 
1970s, see the example reproduced in Schneider (2013: 117). 
30
 Kenyatta (2013a).  
31 See respectively, Omondi (2014); McConnell (2015); and World Bank Group (2016), 
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based in the city. ‘Not just a Kenyan, but an international space’,32 it constituted an 
idealized zone of abundance and orderly consumption, prefiguring the future imagined 
for Kenya in the government’s strategic Vision 2030 (Government of Kenya 2012). 
Visitors to Westgate could be cast accordingly, not merely as private shoppers, but as 
pioneers on behalf of the nation. Its architectural layout excluded those unable to 
consume (ie. the poor) allowing the mall to function as a utopian enclave for the nation. 
This ideal had been shattered into a scene first of violence and chaos by the terrorists 
and then riotous and illegitimate consumption by looting soldiers.33 In a tragic irony it 
was the very closed-off nature of Westgate which enabled both the terrorists and the 
looters. As will be seen in the next section the sober, collective ‘work’ of blood donors 
included repairing this image. 
 
‘WHAT WE WANT IS CONTROL’: ORDER AND ENLIGHTENMENT 
 
The spectacle of mass blood donation could also be taken to instantiate an ideal of 
public order associated with democratic practice, modern governance and civic 
enlightenment. The scene in Uhuru Park was depicted as one of civility and unity.  
‘Everyone was polite to each other and the Red Cross volunteers were doing 
their work diligently. Among the volunteers was celebrity musician Juliani picking 
trash with a black bag. Few who were there then could have doubted the Twitter 
hashtag #WeareOne’ (Wanner 2013). 
 
Drawing on the work of Achille Mbembe, Eggen argues that even seemingly humdrum 
administrative routines like this have a politically effective aesthetic dimension. As 
such they are performative, connoting the justice of a state and its participation in a 
modernity sanctioned by international powers.34 This was true of the blood donation 
queues which bodied forth an ideal of fairness in time and space, mixing people of 
different backgrounds all gathered for a patriotic end (Opalo 2013).35 Their 
                                                 
32
 Gathara (2013). 
33
 On the significance of the ‘enclave’ in contemporary Kenya, see Geissler (2014: 242). The 
centrality of legitimate consumption under neo-liberalism was noted by Bauman with reference 
to the July 2011 riots in London by Bauman (2011).  
34
 See Eggen (2012) and Mbembe (2001). 
35
 On the normative dimensions of queueing, see Moran (2005). 
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combination of randomness and ordering (turn-taking) also allowed them to function 
as a basis for more wide-ranging moral judgment. Wanner recalled that: 
Around three, some politicians came through and went straight to get their blood 
pressure checked and to donate. At this moment when we were supposed to be 
one, the politicians had decided they were too important to stand in line like… 
the rest of the Kenyans who waited patiently … and braved the heat (2013). 
The blood drive also furnished a site for conspicuous diplomatic action. Ambassadors 
arrived to donate, framing this in terms of their own specific strategic concerns: Israel’s 
emphasizing that terrorism was a worldwide problem; Britain’s affirming that his 
country was Kenya’s oldest friend.36 The turnout of ordinary citizens and the 
organizational efforts of the Red Cross and the National Blood Transfusion Service 
allowed the Kenyan state to be an effective addressee for these messages of 
solidarity, confirming its membership of the international community.   
 
An ideal of order is immanent not only to the donor queue, but also to the 
comprehensive and integrated national blood supply system prescribed in detail by 
the World Health Organization (2016). Kenyan recruiters desiring to comply with these 
imperatives seek dedicated legislation to regulate the sector and secure the primacy 
of the National Blood Transfusion Service. As one put it, ‘basically what we want is 
control’.37 This association of legality and a modern blood system was invoked for 
purposes of political criticism in a song recorded in the weeks after Westgate by the 
group Sarabi and socially engaged rapper Juliani, mentioned above. Fuata Sheria 
(‘follow the law’) has a dual address: to the political class for its failures and graft, but 
also to Kenyan citizens for their tolerance of and participation in corruption.38 Moving 
between Kiswahili and English the rap opposes the popular response to Westgate to 
the disproportionate concern for elite politicians charged with crimes after the 2007/8 
post-election violence: 
         Machozi ya perpetrator inaweza dilute damu ya victim ilimwagika 
[The tears of the perpetrator can dilute the shed blood of the victim] 
After all is said and done, all will be said nothing will be done. 
You are not my tribe, but you are my blood type 
                                                 
36
 See respectively Were (2013b) and Turner (2013). 
37
 Interview with Regional Blood Donor Recruiter, Nairobi, 28 October 2013. 
38
 Fuata Sheria by Sarabi Band featuring Juliani (2013) available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QGx_6lMjGI 
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Lakini [but] it doesn't have to take tragedy to know that39 
The imagery here trades on a contrast between what we might call ‘old blood’, marking 
‘tribal’ affiliation and shed at the instigation of ethnicist leaders, and ‘new blood’, 
readable only through the categories of medical science and circulating from donors 
to recipients. The contrast is linked thematically to the song’s title, and to the aspiration 
it expresses for Kenya’s future, precisely through the virtues of legality and order. A 
modern blood system, based on law, is necessary for the circulation of ‘new blood’ 
and the achievement thereby of an inclusive biopolitical community. Moreover, as the 
last line quoted suggests, the work of sustaining democratic citizenship is routine and 
ongoing, like blood donation itself, not just one-off responses to ‘tragedies’ or states of 
emergency. 
 
The order exhibited by a functioning national blood system isn’t only a matter of 
following global norms. It is also a consequence of educating citizens about the 
science of transfusion. Doctors and health administrators have pursued this kind of 
medical enlightenment among the general population, since the late colonial period, 
in anti-syphilis campaigns and policies aimed at suppressing or disciplining traditional 
medicine (Vaughan 1991: 181ff; Ombongi, 2011). Kenyan blood recruiters in the early 
years of independence also worried that ‘traditional prejudices’ among Africans, as 
opposed to those imputed to European settlers or the Asian minority, would be an 
obstacle to increased donation.40 Such ‘fears and superstition’ included, it was 
claimed, notions that donated blood would not be replaced in the body or that people 
of different ethnic backgrounds or genders could donate to each other.41 This 
problematization of beliefs persists, though now oriented to differences of education 
and origin (rural or urban), rather than race.42 The task of the recruiter in this regard 
remains  
                                                 
39
 Fuata Sheria by Sarabi Band featuring Juliani lyrics (2013) available at: 
https://plus.google.com/103429111497850834868/posts/Q6LUuC4GYok 
 
40
 See Ng’weno (1964). 
41
 Dr M Rogoff, Officer in Charge of Kenya Blood Transfusion Service, quoted in Anon (1963).  
42
 Interview with Regional Blood Donor  Recruiter, Nairobi, 4 December 2013 and interview 
with Blood Safety Programme Recruiters, Nairobi, 21 November 2013. 
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to help [potential donors] understand that blood is not based on culture, it’s 
based on group… [and] that all those other cultural beliefs are fine but when it 
comes to blood it’s a totally different concept.43 
Appropriate education would encourage regular donation, itself an indicator of a 
modern temporal consciousness on the part of citizens. An ideal space of order and 
enlightenment, the blood system is thus capable of producing a community of citizen 
donors, productive, patriotic, diligent and dutiful.44 It can function as a ‘barometer of 
civilization’, an index of the state of the nation considered with reference to its 
international peers (Simpson 2009: 105). As an object of national dreaming it is, 
however, vulnerable to confrontation with the real. In the next section, I explore the 
counter-utopian features of actually-existing donation and transfusion in Kenya, the 
persistent factures and disruptions obscured by official crisis rhetoric during Westgate. 
These sustain a trenchant critique not only of the health care system, by of currently 
political arrangements and social inequalities. 
 
‘GIVING BLOOD AND HASHTAGS AREN’T ENOUGH’: DISRUPTING THE 
DREAM 
 
State forces inside the Westgate Mall were, as I have noted above, divided and in 
conflict.45 Lines of command were unclear and information about the progress of the 
operation to free trapped civilians was premature, imprecise and exaggerated. Though 
terrorist action had ceased by the late afternoon of the first day, the siege continued 
for another three days. The roof of the Mall was brought down probably by an army-
fired rocket, though officials initially claimed the smoke was from mattresses which the 
militants had set on fire. Vital forensic evidence was destroyed in the conflagration. 
The truth has not emerged in the intervening years. There has been no public inquiry 
and a Parliamentary Commission tasked with investigating did not address the key 
issue of operational failure (Williams 2014: 907). In its place rumour has circulated 
concerning, for example, the role of foreign agents during the siege and divisions 
between the President, ministers and senior security officials (McConnell 2015).   
 
                                                 
43
 Interview with Blood Safety Programme Recruiters, Nairobi, 21 November 2013. 
44
 This is drawn from Reubi’s historical study of the Singapore blood system (2010). 
45
 This discussion is based on McConnell (2015) and Howden (2013). 
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These rumours also extended to the fate of blood donated during the crisis. The active 
role of the Red Cross in maximizing blood donation was explained not only as a 
humanitarian intervention, but also as an ‘empire-building’ move. In any case the type 
of gunshot wounds suffered at Westgate were unlikely to create a significant demand 
for transfusion. Questions were raised over whether donated blood had gone to waste 
given the lack of storage capacity nationally, though this was strongly denied by 
administrators.46 Grace Musila argues that, in such contexts, rumour gains its 
legitimacy from ‘the suspect nature of truths produced through modern institutions and 
processes’ and the vulnerability of the latter ‘to manipulation by interested parties’ 
(Musila 2015: 112-4). Rumour challenges the legacy of colonial modernity whose 
benefits, in law, medicine and science, were and are distributed in partial and 
discriminatory fashion.  
 
Critique of this nature surfaced among commentators as the impunity of state forces 
and their leaders became clear. Fidel Wangai disrupted the prevalent image of unity, 
productiveness and order. 
We are not one. Do not be fooled. That was a mere con game to get you to use 
the little that you have on those who have more than you do. Look at Westgate. 
As you trooped to centres to donate your blood (which later went to waste) and 
transferred your little money for the rich, Kenya Defence Forces was stealing 
(Wangai 2013). 
Against the representation of a harmonious, ordered biopolitical community formed 
out of altruistic donors unknown to each other, we are offered an image of blood 
appropriated on false pretences and transferred from ordinary Kenyans to the veins of 
local and expatriate rich, or simply thrown away. There is an echo here of blood 
stealing rumours which have long functioned as a vehicle for the articulation of parallel 
truths and subaltern resistance in Kenya (Geissler 2005). Noting that the explosion of 
an unprotected pipeline with 100 fatalities in a Nairobi slum in 2011 had not called forth 
equivalent generosity or memorialisation on a similar scale,47 Wangai sardonically 
advised readers that: 
a) During the [election] campaign periods we are 42 [‘tribes’]. 
                                                 
46
 Interview with Regional Blood Donor  Recruiter, Nairobi, 4 December 2013 and interview 
with Blood Safety Programme Recruiters, Nairobi, 21 November 2013. 
47
 While extra blood was collected after the fire, this was much less than during the Westgate 
crisis. 
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b) When the rich are hit below the belt we are one. 
c) All these other times we are two; the filthy rich and the miserable poor (2013). 
The dialectical irony of shared blood was that in a single movement it both promised 
to transcend ethnic division and reinforced economic inequality and political 
powerlessness. As a hospital blood technician put it, ‘giving blood and hashtags aren’t 
enough’.48  
 
While Kenya has been more successful than most other African states in complying 
with WHO recommendations, the creation of a truly inclusive and national system, 
based on voluntary donation, remains a work in progress for administrators and policy 
makers. As discussed above, collectivist messages have been used to mobilize 
donors since the 1960s, but the current National Blood Transfusion Service (NBTS) 
was only created in 2000 (Schneider 2013: 104). Like the Westgate donations, the 
impetus for the latter came from the terrorist bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in 
1998 in which 241 Kenyan citizens were killed.49 American influence on the Service 
has been profound since its inception: 90% of funding is provided by the United States 
Agency for International Development and the Centres for Disease Control provide 
extensive training and operational guidance (Kenya National Blood Transfusion 
Service n.d). Though formally subject to the Ministry of Health, it is as much a 
transnational, as a national enterprise (de Sousa Santos 2006).50  
 
Currently the NBTS obtains about 135,000 units of blood annually through drives 
conducted by itself and by partner organizations such as the Kenya Red Cross, the 
Bloodlink Foundation, which organizes workplace donations, and Hope World Wide 
Kenya, which targets faith groups (Dutta, et al 2012; Anon 2009). This is a great 
improvement on the 22,000 units collected in the first year of the Service, but still far 
less than the 410,700 recommended for Kenya by the WHO (Kangwele 2014). 65% of 
donations are ‘voluntary’, ie. given anonymously to the NBTS, a threefold increase 
since 2001 (Kimani et al 2011). The remainder is still made up of blood supplied by 
                                                 
48
 Interview with Laboratory Administrator, Nairobi, 15 October 2013. 
49
 As with Westgate the popular response to the embassy attack, including a similar wave of 
voluntary blood donation, was taken as a token of deeper and better political values, 
challenging Kenyans’ view of themselves as cynical, disengaged and disunited, see 
Economist (1998). 
50
 On the ‘transnationalization’ of states in the global south, see de Sousa Santos (2006). 
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patients’ relatives direct to hospitals. Such ‘family replacement donations’ were by far 
the predominant mode of collecting blood in East Africa until the 1990s (Schneider 
2013: 67). However, they present a significantly increased risk of transfusion 
transmissible infection.51 They also limit the model of a common national blood bank 
in favour of multiple micro-communities of debt and replenishment. Around 60% of 
voluntary donors are secondary students targeted in drives conducted at their schools 
(Dutta 2012; Oudia 2013). While this is a reliable and comparatively safe source of 
blood, recruiters recognize the ethical concerns raised by this practice, in particular as 
regards the voluntariness of consent.52  
 
‘WE ARE PART OF YOU’: STRATEGY AND INCLUSION 
 
The ideal of a unified national blood system is subject to significant limitations. In 
addition to family replacement donations, group initiatives take some residents of 
Kenya out of the pool of donors and recipients. For example, the German Foreign 
Ministry has run ‘walking blood bank’ schemes through its embassies in Africa, 
including Kenya, for the last 30 years (Botschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
Nairobi n.d). Staff at the Embassy, Goethe Institute, and the Nairobi German School, 
as well as German Nationals more generally, are encouraged to enrol in a list of 
potential donors and recipients, with their contact details and bloodgroup. The list 
mimics the gated communities in which many expatriates live, and indeed the malls in 
which they shop. A biosocial exclave, it is motivated by concerns about the risk of 
transfusion transmissible infections and, perhaps more superficially, on the basis that 
prevalent blood groups in Africa are less prominent among Europeans. Such 
communities are constituted negatively under the sign of pragmatism, setting 
themselves against the desire for a worldwide system of reliable blood transfusion 
which ultimately animates the endeavours of the World Health Organization in this 
area. 
 
                                                 
51
 For instance, HIV prevalence in voluntary donations is 2.6%, in replacement donations 
7.4% (Kimani et al 2011). 
52
 Interview with National Blood Safety Coordinator, Nairobi, 2 December 2013 and interview 
with Bloodlink Foundation Director, Nairobi, 22 October 2013. 
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Positioned between such opt-out systems and the drive for inclusion of individual 
Kenyans regardless of ‘tribe’, are the initiatives of groups which seek to donate to the 
national pool and to be recognized as group donors for strategic purposes. Within 
hours of the Westgate attack starting the Somali Ambassador, His Excellency 
Mohammed Ali Nur, sought to spread the message that Somalis were as much victims 
of Al-Shabaab as Kenyans, via social media, as well as national and international 
broadcasters (Shephard 2013). He contacted Abbas Gullet Secretary General of the 
Red Cross, himself a Kenyan Somali, arranging to make a blood donation with full 
publicity and called on his fellow Somalis to follow suit ‘so that Kenyans could see that 
we are with them’.53 With the ambassador’s encouragement, a group of women from 
Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali neighbourhood of Nairobi, delivered food to security 
and rescue services at Westgate on the first day of the siege (Anon 2013b). The 
following day a blood drive was organized by the District Business Association, with 
men proceeding from the main mosque to the Andalus hospital. It must be noted that 
the donations were grounded in religious imperatives: to defend the name of Islam and 
to practice charitable giving or ‘sadaqa’.54 But they were also explicitly aimed at self-
protection. Interviewed in the weeks after Westgate both the ambassador and the 
community leaders felt that they had succeeded in this, winning the approval of the 
President and forestalling a violent backlash.55  
 
This confidence was disappointed in April 2014 when the government launched 
operation Usalama Watch in Eastleigh and elsewhere in the city (Anderson and 
McKnight 2014: 21). Police and paramilitary forces conducted house to house 
searches, detaining around 650 people in a football stadium and engaging in 
widespread theft, harassment and beatings. Justified by one senior journalist on the 
basis that ‘every little two-bit Somali has a dream to blow us up’,56 the operation 
continued the state practice of marginalizing and abusing the community in Nairobi 
and the North-Eastern region. The Shifta insurgency, mentioned above, had been 
                                                 
53
 Interview with the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Nairobi, 26 November 
2013.  
54
 Interview with Eastleigh Business District Association, Nairobi, 30 November 2013. Blood 
donation is interpreted by many Islamic scholars, and by recruiters in Muslim countries, as a 
form of sadaqa, see Van den Branden and Broeckaert (2011). 
55
 Interview with the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Nairobi, 26 November 
2013 and Interview with Eastleigh Business District Association, Nairobi, 30 November 2013. 
56
  See Mathiu (2014). 
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crushed using punitive tactics pioneered by the British during Kenya’s independence 
struggle (Whittaker 2014: 89ff).  In the 1980s state forces massacred hundreds of 
Kenyan Somali civilians in two notorious incidents.57 At the end of that decade the Moi 
government introduced a scheme forcing members of the community to prove their 
nationality and adopt special identification, leading to further police harassment and 
deportations (Lochery 2012: 617). 
   
Blood donation and philanthropy more generally have also been of strategic 
significance for Kenya’s Asian minority. Emergency care, support and counselling for 
many victims of the Westgate attacks and their relatives was provided at facilities 
associated with the community such as the Oshwal Centre and the Aga Khan and MP 
Shah hospitals in Nairobi (Verini 2013). Long queues of blood donors formed at these 
clinics on the first day of the attack.58 This response built on a well-established tradition 
of charitable work remarked on, for example, by official blood donation recruiters.59 
Thus, the Jain community has organized drives since 1978 for the benefit of Kenyatta 
National Hospital and latterly the National Blood Transfusion Service.60 The founder 
of this initiative explains it within a double frame as regards meaning and motivation.61 
On the one hand the individual donation is inspired by the religious-ethical tradition of 
seva or anonymous charitable giving without expectation of reward or honour.62 On 
the other hand aggregated donations signal to ‘the government [that] we are not only 
doing things for ourselves but for others’.63 In an essay suggestively titled ‘Kenya 
Damu’ (Kenya Blood), Sunny Bindra notes the impetus for this combination of charity 
and publicity: the tendency of demagogues, in parliament and outside, to attack Asians 
for being inward-looking, unpatriotic and exploitative of the majority population, and a 
resulting history of exclusion from state employment, expropriation and expulsion 
across East Africa (2005).64  
 
                                                 
57At Garissa in 1980 and Wagalla in 1984 (estimated 3,000 and 5,000 deaths respectively). 
For an excellent documentary on this history, see Al Jazeera (2013).  
58
 Author, personal observation, and interview with Laboratory Administrator, Nairobi, 15 
October 2013. 
59
 Interview with Regional Blood Donor Recruiter, Nairobi, 28 October 2013 
60
 Interview with Jain Community Organizer, Nairobi, 22 November 2013.  
61
 Interview with Jain Community Organizer, Nairobi, 22 November 2013 
62
 See Copeman (2005)  
63
 Interview with Jain Community Organizer, Nairobi, 22 November 2013 
64
 For an early report, see Theroux (1967). 
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The ambition to overcome ‘tribalism’ through blood donation discussed above can be 
distinguished from the Somali and Asian efforts in response to Westgate and more 
generally. In the former case, anonymity facilitated a dissolution of the donor’s ethnic 
identity and their merging into the ‘body’ of the nation. A unified Kenya would be 
realized from its constitutive ‘tribes’. In the latter, by contrast, the donated blood retains 
a collective marker, coming as it does not from a member of an ethnic group integral 
to the nation, but from a group often perceived from the outset as non-national or alien. 
As Carrier and Lochery have noted of Eastleigh residents, ‘the state is very much 
missed and longed for’, but from outside as it were (2013: 335). Blood donation is a 
tangible mode of giving form to this longing for inclusion and the benefits of citizenship 
under the law. It is, in the words of one Asian recruiter, a means of showing that ‘we 
are part of you’.65 But it functions thus as an index, not of integral belonging, but of 
something more like an external biopolitical association.66  
CONCLUSION 
The wave of donation after Westgate confirmed the importance of the blood system 
as a site for imagining the nation. But it also suggested that these dreams are not one, 
but several. There are many dreamers, their visions sometimes in contradiction. The 
crisis rhetoric of political leaders and established media sources saw in blood 
collection and transfusion a means for Kenya to prove itself a unified nation, 
participating in scientific and administrative regimes sanctioned by international 
expertise. This suggests a continuity of what we might call ‘elite dreams’ from the early 
independence period to the present, notwithstanding the rise and fall of state-led 
development, and the imposition of the neo-liberal adjustment. Our study of media 
reports and comment suggests that these elite dreams overlap with understandings of 
the significance of national donation and transfusion systems among the wider 
population. The real potential for blood to cross ethnic divides was also gestured at in 
popular opinion. However, as we saw, various ‘dreamers’ put the donation to quite 
different uses. Rather than a simple means of affirming elite ambitions and aligning 
Kenya with the western military coalition pursuing the ‘war on terror’, some saw in the 
mode of donation itself a vehicle for moral criticism of the political class and for 
                                                 
65
 Interview with Jain Community Organizer, Nairobi, 22 November 2013. 
66
 Ethiopian Jews in Israel and gay men in the United States have campaigned to be allowed 
to donate blood in just such terms, see respectively Seeman (1999) and Strong (2009). 
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imagining a Kenya committed to values of formal equality and the rule of law. 
Optimistic readings were challenged as illusory by more sceptical perspectives which 
alleged a shallow commitment to justice given massive substantive inequality and the 
enduring capacity of elites to stoke ethnic enmity as a means to their own self-
preservation. What Musila has called the paradoxes of colonial modernity, promised 
and limited, claimed and denied in the same movement,67 continued to shape the real 
blood system and the wider society.  Finally, we observed strategic blood donation 
among ‘pariah’ groups, positioned beyond the national community and subjected to 
‘graduated citizenship’68 by the authorities since independence. Even here, however, 
a clear defensive motive was augmented by the dream of a more inclusive Kenya. 
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